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Article 3

Federalization of the Law of Charity
Mark L. Ascher*
To this day, the law of charity is often thought of as a matter for the
states. In fact, the crucial law relating to charity is now almost always federal.
For certain purposes, state law still determines whether a given entity is
"charitable." It also determines the propriety of a charitable fiduciary's
conduct when someone who has standing sues. But federal law determines
whether an entity qualifies for various tax incentives, such as exemption from
the federal income tax and eligibility to receive tax-deductible gifts, and
qualification for these incentives generally determines whether the entity
comes into existence and, if so, whether it survives. Federal law also wields a
bewildering array of draconian penalties against both charities and their
fiduciariesfor failure to comply with federally specified rules of behavior. This
Article examines both of these and other ways in which federal law has
essentially taken over the law of charity. The point is not whether
federalization of the law of charity is good or bad. The point is simply this:
During the last century, Congress and the federal courts federalized the law of
charity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of charity has long been thought of as a matter for the
states. Indeed, until early in the last century, when the federal
government enacted the income, gift, and estate taxes, the law of
charity was an exclusively state concern. Federalization of the law of
charity has now proceeded to such an extent, however, that it eclipses
state law. Whether from a conceptual, organizational, or operational
perspective, the crucial law relating to charity is now almost always
federal.
State law still determines whether a given entity is
"charitable," but federal law determines whether an entity qualifies
for various tax incentives, such as exemption from the federal income
tax and eligibility to receive tax-deductible gifts, and qualification for
these incentives generally determines whether the entity comes into
existence and, if so, whether it survives. State law continues to
determine the propriety of a charitable fiduciary's conduct; indeed, on
those rather rare occasions when someone sufficiently interested in
enforcing a charitable fiduciary's duties is found to have standing,
state law remains ascendant. On the other hand, federal law not only
specifies in great detail how a charity that wants to become and
remain eligible for federal tax incentives must behave, it also wields a
bewildering array of often draconian penalties against both charities
and their fiduciaries for failure to toe the federally specified lines.
Certainly, the federal rules do not always coincide with the parallel
state-law rules; nor does Congress seem to have intended them to.
State law continues to permit the creation of various and sundry
devices for the benefit of charity, but because under federal law only a
favored few qualify their donors for the charitable deduction, no
competent counselor would ever recommend anything else.
Notwithstanding the fact that federal tax law has dramatically shrunk
the universe of rational choices by which to benefit charity, the use of
trusts to benefit charity seems to have increased dramatically-and
the increase seems in no small part attributable to federal tax
incentives. Yet the uniqueness of the approved federal devices and the
detailed federal requirements that accompany them indisputably
strain the state-law system that usually ends up interpreting and
enforcing the governing instruments. Nowhere is this clearer than in
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the case of charitable conservation easements. And these are only
some of the many ways in which federal law is dramatically reshaping
the law of charity. Thus, while the law of charity, as developed and
maintained by the states, remains relevant in many and sometimes
vital ways, most of the charity-related law that really matters these
days is federal.
Whether federalization of the law of charity is good or bad is
not the point. As is true of most things, one might rightly observe that
it is both. There seems to be virtual consensus that in most states,
enforcement of charity and the obligations of charitable fiduciaries has
long been essentially nonexistent. Given the states' massive failure in
this regard, it seems hard to argue that a federal intrusion or virtual
takeover of the field serves no legitimate purpose, or that it is
consequentially inconsistent with state law. And yet federalization of
the law of charity most certainly has been and continues to be both
ham-fisted and overly complex. Nor is the objective to conjure up a
vast federal conspiracy to wrest the law of charity from the states. The
process was instead almost surely just a logical consequence of the
twin congressional decisions to impose income, estate, and gift taxes,
and to grant charity immensely privileged statuses under each. Once
Congress thus got its nose under the tent flap, it eventually came to
understand that, given most states' failure to police the behavior of
charities and their fiduciaries, it was paying dearly with tax dollars
for charity that often never happened. No later than with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, in which Congress imposed both the excise taxes
on private foundations and the split-interest rules, Congress
undeniably began to chart a course of policing charities and their
fiduciaries, explicitly and on a national basis. The point here, however,
is considerably simpler. Something very important happened during
the last century. The federal government basically took over the law of
charity.
II. WHAT IS "CHARITABLE"?
Whether a particular purpose or entity qualifies as "charitable"
has long been, and continues to be, a matter of state law. Copious
amounts of state law, both statutory and judicial, make this clear.1
Neither the legislation nor the cases have tapered off. State law
remains relevant in a variety of ways, including whether a particular

1.
See generally 6 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L.
ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS ch. 38 (5th ed. 2009) (providing a comprehensive
overview of charitable purposes as defined across time and jurisdiction).
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corporation qualifies under state law as a not-for-profit, whether a
particular entity qualifies for state or local tax exemptions, and
whether, upon failure of the entity's original purpose, cy pres is
available to salvage the entity's existence. 2 There is no risk that state
law relating to what constitutes charity will become irrelevant
anytime soon.
On the other hand, these days, it's federal law that really
matters insofar as what's charitable. It's all fine and good to be a
philanthropist, but few, if any, major donors knowingly make
charitable transfers for which they will receive no deduction for
income tax purposes, let alone for which they will generate a transfer
tax, either during life or at death. So anyone involved in the planning
of a major gift to charity, or, for that matter, the conception of a new
charity or the operation of an already existing charity, is or should be
keenly concerned with whether the charity in question qualifies to
receive transfers that are deductible for income and gift or estate tax
purposes. This is almost entirely a matter of federal law. 3 Similarly,
anyone creating or operating a charity is or should be keenly aware of
the need to ensure that the entity's income not be subjected to the
federal income tax. This, too, is a matter that is almost exclusively
federal. 4 Indeed, the regulations require that language in a section
501(c)(3) charity's governing instrument limit its purposes to one or
more of those described in the federal statute.5
Nor are the differences between state and federal law always
trivial. To be federally exempt, section 501(c)(3), the primary provision
relating to what has traditionally passed for charity, requires a
charity to be
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation ... and which does not participate in, or intervene in

2.
See, e.g., 5 id. §§ 37.1.1, 37.1.4, 37.4.2.2 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing qualifications for
nonprofit incorporation, requirements for tax-exempt status, and availability of cy pres).
3.
See I.R.C. § 170(a), (c) (2012) (providing for deductibility of charitable contributions for
purposes of federal income tax); id. § 2055 (providing for deductibility of bequests to charitable
organizations for purposes of federal estate tax); id. § 2522 (providing for deductibility of gifts to
charitable organizations for purposes of federal gift tax).
4.
See id. § 501(a), (c)-(d) (providing federal income tax exemption for certain types of
charitable organizations).
5.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (as amended in 2014) (requiring limitation of
purposes of certain tax-exempt organizations to those specified in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
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(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 6

Plainly, the general tenor of section 501(c)(3) is consistent with
traditional state-law notions of "what's charitable." 7 Nonetheless,
there are obvious differences in both tone and detail. Testing for public
safety may well now be widely viewed as charitable under state law,
but this purpose's presence and prominence in the section 501(c)(3)
list are glaring.8 That no substantial part of a charity's activities can
be focused on a legislative agenda is a far sharper limitation than
most states prescribe. 9 And the supposedly absolute ban on
electioneering is also well beyond what most states require. 10
It is true that under state law the definition of charity has
always been consciously open-ended and deeply intertwined with
"public policy."" But the states determined the bounds of the relevant
public policy and its influence. Now, Congress, the IRS, and the
federal courts often police, refine, and redefine the concept of charity
and articulate the public policies that supposedly delimit it. In Bob
Jones University v. United States,12 for example, the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld the authority of the IRS to deny the taxexempt status of an acknowledged university run by an acknowledged
church 1 3 because it discriminated on the basis of race in its admissions

6.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
7.
See 6 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, at ch. 38 (providing a comprehensive
overview of charitable purposes as defined across time and jurisdiction).
8.
See id. § 38.7.11 (discussion of community purposes traditionally viewed as charitable
omits testing for public safety).
9.
See id. § 38.7.1, 38.7.7-.7.9 (noting that most states do not withhold charitable status
from organizations whose legislative activity consists exclusively of lobbying in favor of
legislative changes generally beneficial to the community).
10. See id. § 38.7.8 (noting that organizations may be found charitable under state law
even when they engage in electioneering so long as the relevant cause is charitable, as opposed to
political).
11.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. f (2003) ("Like other trusts, charitable
trusts are subject to the rule . . . that trust purposes and provisions must not be unlawful or
contrary to public policy."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 cmt. c (1959) ("A trust for a
purpose the accomplishment of which is contrary to public policy . . . is invalid."); 6 SCOTT,
FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 38.11 ("A trust fails for illegality if the accomplishment of
its purposes is contrary to public policy in the community in which the trust is created, when the
trust

is created.");

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF

CHARITABLE

NONPROFIT

ORGS.

§

100(c)

(Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (stating that a purpose is not charitable if it
is unlawful or against public policy).
12.
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
13.
"The record ... leaves no doubt . . . that Bob Jones University is both an educational
institution and a religious institution." Id. at 605 n.32. Education and religion are, of course, two
of the most prototypically charitable purposes. See Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4
(Eng.) (recognizing both educational and religious uses as charitable); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
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policies, 14 notwithstanding that it claimed its policies emanated from
religious dogma. The Court's rationale was that a charity failed to
qualify as such for federal tax purposes if it violated "fundamental" 15
or "established" 16 public policy. In one sense, as we have already seen,
there is nothing new here, because under state law charities have
always had to be consistent with public policy. 17 Public policy, like
beauty, however, is often mostly-or even entirely-in the eye of the
beholder. It may be possible simply to treat Bob Jones as a race case, 18
the holding of which state attorneys general and courts will
increasingly embrace or perhaps already have fully embraced. Still,
the more general rationale of Bob Jones strongly suggests that the
federal government has the final say, at least in any meaningful way,
about what is charitable. 19 Indeed, subsequent IRS pronouncements
have extended the federal prerogative to deny charitable status to
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 11, § 100(b)(2)-(3) (classifying both "education" and
'promotion of religion" as charitable purposes).
14. See also Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113 (ruling that organizations that operate
community recreational facilities are not eligible for charitable exemption from federal income
taxation when access to such facilities is restricted on the basis of race); Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (enjoining IRS from granting tax-exempt status to any
racially discriminatory school), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), abrogatedby
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (permanently enjoining IRS from granting tax-exempt status to
private schools in Mississippi that maintained racially discriminatory admissions policies), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230-31
("[A] school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable'
within the common law concepts reflected in [federal law] and accordingly does not qualify as an
organization exempt from [flederal income tax.").
15. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592-94, 596 n.21, 598.
16. Id. at 586, 591.
17.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Note also, however, that the Principles of the
Law of CharitableNonprofit Organizationsadded the word "fundamental" to its formulation of
the public policy exception directly in response to the opinion in Bob Jones. PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 11, § 100(c) & cmt. d.
18. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8910001 (Mar. 10, 1989) (extending the holding of Bob
Jones to deny tax-exempt status to a trust organized for the benefit of "worthy and deserving
[elderly] white persons" because its disbursements were restricted on the basis of race).
19. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 230 ("All charitable trusts ... are subject to the
requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy."
(emphasis added)); Johnny Rex Buckles, Do Law Schools Forfeit Federal Income Tax Exemption
When They Deny Military Recruiters Full Access to Career Services Programs?: The Hypothetical
Case of Yale University v. Commissioner, 41 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2009) (arguing that, under
federal law, it would be possible for a court to conclude that private law schools that deny
military recruiters equal access to recruitment programs are not tax exempt, because it would
violate "fundamental" public policy under the Bob Jones framework in light of federal law
making certain benefits contingent upon such access); Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public
Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 398 (2005) (noting the growing influence of federal
requirements for tax-exempt status on what constitutes "fundamental" and "established" public
policy across the several states).
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include, among others, situations involving payments by a hospital in
violation of a federal antikickback statute 20 and cruelty to animals. 21
True, all these examples relate "only" to taxes, but favorable federal
tax consequences are essential to the viability of most modern
charities. 22
Nor are the income, gift, and estate taxes the only levers the
federal government uses to define, refine, and redefine the concept of
charity. For example, a little-discussed feature of the Affordable Care
Act requires hospitals to establish written financial assistance
policies, limit amounts charged for emergency and other medically
necessary care to individuals eligible for assistance under those
policies, and refrain from certain types of collection activities. 23 In
addition, each hospital must conduct a "community health needs
assessment" at least once every three yearS24 or pay a $50,000 excise
tax.25
III. REGULATING FIDUCIARY CONDUCT

State law imposes a variety of duties on charitable fiduciaries,
as well as on private fiduciaries who administer funds for charitable
purposes either temporarily or on a long-term basis, such as the

20.
21.

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200837039 (May 19, 2008).

22.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS.

§

520 (Tentative Draft

No. 4, 2013) (noting "the importance to most charities of obtaining and maintaining federal tax
exemption

and other favorable tax treatments"); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT

ORGS. § 620 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2011) ("For some charities, loss of exemption can be
catastrophic . . . ."). On the other hand, Bob Jones University waited until 2000 to end the
discriminatory policies at issue in the litigation that reached the Supreme Court. Johnny Rex
Buckles, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Journey iTrough Scripture and History, in
LAW AND RELIGION: CASES IN CONTEXT 85, 101 (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010). To this day, the
university itself (as distinguished from certain associated charities) remains noticeably absent
from the IRS online list of charities eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. (The IRS has
discontinued Publication 78, Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the
IRC.) Exempt OrganizationsSelect Check for Bob Jones University in Greenville, S.C., INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE, http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ pub78Search.doeinl &names=Bob+Jones+
University&city=Greenville&state=SC&country=US&deductibility all&dispatchMethod search
Charities&submitName=Search, archived at http:// perma.cc/7SLC-AYUY (last updated Aug. 18,
2014); see also Where to Give, BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, http://www.bju.edu/giving/where-togive.php, archived at http://perma.cc/HN5W-UFDY (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (listing both
deductible and nondeductible giving opportunities).
23.
I.R.C. § 5 01(r) (2 0 12 ) (enacted by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9007
(2010)).
24. Id. § 501(r)(3). The IRS has even threatened to revoke a hospitals tax-exempt status
for failing to comply. Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 Fed.
Reg. 20,523, 20,527 (proposed Apr. 5, 2013).
25.
I.R.C. § 4959. For final and temporary regulations, see T.D. 9629, 2013-37 I.R.B. 188.
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executors of estates or the trustees of trusts whose beneficiaries
include charities. Perhaps foremost among those duties is the duty of
loyalty, which, generally speaking, forbids a fiduciary from taking any
advantage of the position except compensation for serving as
fiduciary. 26 But the duty of loyalty is only part of the story. State law
also imposes the duty to administer a charity in accordance with its
terms and applicable law, 2 7 the duty of care or prudence, 28 the duty to
control and protect the charity's property, 29 and the duty to keep
records, 30 to name only a few. Thus, state law remains central, at least

26. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 & cmt. (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 588-94 (2006) ("A
trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 & cmt. a (2007) ("[T]rustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose."); PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 300 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (recognizing the duty of
loyalty owed by charitable trustees); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 17.2 (5th ed.

2007).
27.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801, 7C U.L.A. 587 ("[T]rustee shall administer the trust in
good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and
in accordance with this [Code]"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (2007) ("The trustee has
a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the
trust and applicable law."); id. § 78(1) (trustee of charitable trust "has duty to administer the
trust

. .

. solely in

furtherance

of its

charitable purpose);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TRUSTS § 379 cmt. a (1959) (trustee of charitable trust must "administer it solely in the interest
of effectuating the [trust's] charitable purposes"); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note
1, §§ 17.1, 17.14 (5th ed. 2007); Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalizationof Fiduciary Obedience
Norms in Tax Laws Governing Charities:An Introductionto State Law Concepts and an Analysis
of Their Implications for Federal Tax Law, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 197, 204-05
(2012) (summarizing various formulations of the duty of obedience across jurisdictions); Linda
Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience in
Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 904-05 (2007) (arguing for continued existence of legal duty
for charitable tiduciaries to administer charitable organizations consistent with their charitable
purposes).
28. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 ("A trustee shall administer the trust as a
prudent person would . . . ."); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1987) ("A
director shall discharge his or her duties ... with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 77 (2007) ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust as a prudent person
would .... The duty of prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care . . . ."); PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 300, 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (describing the duty of
care); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 17.6 (5th ed. 2007).
29. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 809, 812, 7C U.L.A. 606, 608 (describing the fiduciary's duty
to protect and control trust property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(2)(b) (2007) (noting
that trustees are charged with "collecting and protecting trust property"); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER &
ASCHER, supranote 1, §§ 17.7, 17.8 (5th ed. 2007).
30. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 810, 7C U.L.A. 607 ("A trustee shall keep adequate records of
the administration of the trust."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 (2007) ("A trustee has a
duty to maintain clear, complete, and accurate . . . records regarding . . . the administration of

the trust. . . ."); 3 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 17.4 (5th ed. 2007).
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in theory, to enforcing the fiduciary obligations of those who run or
hold funds for charities. 31

A. Impediments to State-Law Enforcement
Unfortunately, there are huge impediments to state-law
enforcement. First, we should not expect those who run charities
readily or often to ask the courts to enforce duties against themselves.
True, one or more trustees or members of a governing board may
occasionally seek to involve a court in an internal dispute over
management or control of a charity. Indeed, there are occasions when
all of the trustees or board members seek judicial advice as to a
certain course of conduct. But these occasions are few and far
between; moreover, they usually involve charities whose managers, or
at least some of them, are doing their utmost to run their charities
well.
Second, charities hesitate to bite the hand that feeds them and
thereby become known as "litigious." Even when charities learn of
fiduciary misconduct (by an executor or private trustee, for example)
diametrically opposed to their own interests, they sometimes fail to
seek judicial relief. 32 With the affected charity thus out of the
litigation loop, standing raises its ugly head in a particularly
significant way. Traditional black-letter law is that only the state
attorney general and those with a "special" interest have standing to
enforce a charitable trust. 33 Yet, for the most part, state attorneys
general have been notoriously asleep at the wheel in enforcing
charitable fiduciary norms. 34 In addition, state courts have generally
31.

See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT

ORGS., supra note

11, § 130(a) ("The laws of a charity's home state govern matters involving the charity's internal
affairs, including the performance of fiduciary duties . . . .").
32. This is one of the very reasons why state attorneys general are so widely tasked with
supervising charities.
33. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 37.3.10 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that
attorneys general, trustees, and persons with special interests in the administration of the trust
are generally the only parties who may sue for enforcement of a charitable trust).
34. See id. ("[I]n the absence of statutory reforms, the enforcement of charitable trusts has
been more or less sporadic."); Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128-29 (2007) (according to author's
survey, nearly three-quarters of the states had, at most, one full-time attorney tasked with
charitable oversight; seventeen had none); Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 451-52 (1960) (asserting that
piecemeal enforcement of charitable trusts is due to practical inability of state attorneys general
to monitor day-to-day activities of charitable trusts); Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency
Costs, CharitableTrusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 749, 816-19 (2008) (suggesting that supervision of charitable trusts by state attorneys
general is inefficient and outlining alternative supervisory frameworks); Robert Franklin, Critics
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been slow to identify plaintiffs with interests sufficiently special to
merit standing. 35 Even donors themselves have, until very recently,
generally not had standing to enforce their own charitable trusts. 36
Finally-and perhaps most importantly-many charities are
organized not as trusts, as to which the full rigor of trust law is at
least in theory available to control fiduciary behavior, but as not-forprofit corporations, as to which a substantially less rigorous set of
rules regulates fiduciary behavior. 37 What all this surely means is that
the number of instances in which state courts are invited to review
claims involving charitable fiduciary misconduct is merely the tip of a
very large iceberg.38 Indeed, the small number of reported cases

Say Charity Watchdogs Are Nearly Toothless; Many State Agencies Have Inadequate Staff,
Resources, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 28, 1992, at 03B (quoting former Illinois charities
bureau chief, "[W]e should tell our citizens that nobody in Illinois is looking at this stuff. If you
want to give to a charity, you're on your own.").
35. See, e.g., 5 ScOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 37.3.10 (5th ed. 2008) (noting
that courts generally require a showing that an individual is "entitled to benefits under the trust
that are greater than or different from those to which members of the public are entitled
generally" before they are willing to find that a third party has a sufficiently special interest to
merit standing in a suit seeking to enforce a charitable trust).
36. Id.
37.
See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701
(2008) (asserting that duties imposed upon directors of nonprofit corporations are an ineffective
tool due to lax enforcement regimes); Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic
Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457,
466-67 (1996) ("[T]he law . . . imposes the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care on nonprofit
boards. But, because of the lack of classes of private persons with standing to sue, in many ways
this is a legal obligation without a legal sanction."); Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's
Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI-KENT L. REV. 641 (2005) (advocating migration from the
nonprofit corporate form to the charitable trust form to improve nonprofit governance); Evelyn
Brody, The Limits of Charity FiduciaryLaw, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, The
Limits] (recognizing the weak controls available to ensure that nonprofit corporations perform
their charitable purposes effectively); Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity
Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 195-96 (2012)
[hereinafter Brody, Sunshine and Shadows] (describing typical state involvement as the
secretary of state issuing a certificate of incorporation and receiving annual filings; only a few
states require registration or filings with the attorney general); Henry B. Hansmann, The
Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations:Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 807, 814-16 (1989) (describing the trend in corporate law towards aligning the legal
duties of directors of nonprofit corporations with the duties required of directors of for-profit
corporations, rather than with the stricter duties required of charitable fiduciaries); Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) (providing a
broad overview of the nonprofit corporate form); Sugin, supra note 27 (advocating higher
fiduciary duty for directors of charitable nonprofit corporations).
38. One study reports, for example, that charities commonly enter into transactions with
board members for both goods and services. See Francie Ostrower, Nonprofit Governance in the
United States: Findings on Performance and Accountability from the First National
Representative Study, URBAN INSTITUTE 7 (2007), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411479_NonprofitGovernance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WN9G-86YP.
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involving charitable fiduciary misconduct each year seems to bear out
this suspicion. 39

B. FederalRegulation
In contrast, there are numerous ways in which federal law
seeks to, and no doubt does, deter fiduciary misconduct involving
charities. 40 The very same tax provisions that identify entities as
charitable require not only that they be organized to pursue certain
defined charitable objectives but also that they be operated to do so. 4 1
Under the regulations, a section 501(c)(3) entity must engage
"primarily in activities which accomplish" its exempt purposes. 42 If
more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance
of an exempt purpose," the entity fails this so-called operational test, 43
which seems plainly designed as a federal backstop to what state trust
law requires by way of the duty to administer a charity in accordance
with its terms and applicable law.
One of the most prominent federal precepts to which charitable
entities must adhere is that "no part of the net earnings ... inure[] to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."44 Enforcement of
this precept directly mimics the state law duty of loyalty,4 5 and there
is every reason to believe not only that charities are keen on avoiding
39. See Brody, Sunshine and Shadows, supra note 37, at 214 ("Few cases involving
nonprofit fiduciary issues have reached the courts.").
40.

§

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE

NONPROFIT

ORGS.,

supra note

11,

130 cmt. e(1) ("The rules of federal tax exemption essentially create a uniform floor for charity
fiduciaries, and the Internal Revenue Service enforces the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code independently of state enforcement of nonprofit laws."); Brody, The Limits, supra note 37,
at 1414 ("Regulatory authority over nonprofit fiduciaries . . . has moved increasingly to the
federal level . . . ."); Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalizationof the Duty of Loyalty Governing
Charity Fiduciaries Under United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L.J. 645, 646 (2011) ("[T]he duty of
loyalty owed by trustees of charitable trusts and directors of charitable corporations under state
law is now largely eclipsed by federal tax laws that effectively regulate fiduciary behavior.");
Henry Hansmann, Discussant Remarks and Audience Questions at the Case Western Reserve
Law Review Symposium: What Is Charity? Implications for Law and Policy (Nov. 4, 1988), 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 829, 837 (1989) ("We have turned to federal tax law to establish the
fiduciary duties of officers and directors. It has been federal tax law by default because the state
corporation statutes have been empty . . . on the subject. Section 501 therefore imposes the
duties for most nonprofit institutions.").
41. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4) (2012).
42.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2014).
43. Id.
44. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4).
45.
See Buckles, supra note 40, at 661-62 ("[T]he prohibition against private
inurement . . . largely subsumes the duty of loyalty. When a charity violates the prohibition
against private inurement, the violation will often be explained by a breach of the duty of
loyalty.").
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difficulties of this sort4 6 but also that the IRS is keen on making sure
that they do.4 7 In addition, federal law requires that the governing
instruments of private foundations prohibit acts of self-dealing and
other activities that would result in imposition of any of a number of
federal excise taxes, as a condition of gaining tax-exempt status.4 8
As the recent scandal involving primarily Tea Party and other
conservative groups proves, the IRS sometimes expends considerable
resources purporting to ensure that at least certain charities or
pseudo-charities are, in fact, operated in accordance with federal

46. See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine et al., Transparency: What the EO Board Needs to Know
About Executive Compensation, 46 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 23 (2004) (noting a trend toward
increased board participation in executive compensation decisionmaking as a means to ensure
that the organization is not in violation of the prohibition on private inurement).
47. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (defining the precept as a general prohibition
against "private interest," as opposed to merely inurement for the benefit of certain insiders);
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting IRS claims
that the charity's exclusive relationship with a fundraising company deprived it of tax-exempt
status); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Cl. Ct. 1969)
(authorizing collection of taxes from a church when evidence indicated that members of the board

made personal use of its income); Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1070 (1989)
(upholding IRS denial of petitioner's request for tax-exempt status because its net earnings
inured to the benefit of Republican candidates and entities more than incidentally); Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 454 (1984) (upholding IRS revocation of petitioner's
tax-exempt status because, inter alia, its net earnings inured to the benefit of key personnel
within the church), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200736031 (Sept. 7,
2007) ("The Service's position is that the payment of [a portion of the organization's earnings] to
a corporation closely held by the [d]irector [of the organization] establishes that [the
organization] operates for a substantial[ly] non exempt purpose."); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200535029 (Sept. 2, 2005) (ruling that an organization with no historical revenues or expenses
failed to satisfy the operational test when there was reason to suspect that the organization's
earnings would inure to the benefit of one or more board members); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200514021 (Apr. 8, 2005) (ruling that an organization created to offer debt counseling to the
public was not tax-exempt because its board members provided these services for profit); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200510031 (Mar. 11, 2005) (ruling that an organization failed the operational test
because of the high risk of private inurement associated with the fact that its officers and board
members were all closely related); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199907021 (May 20, 1998) (ruling that a
transaction with a board member did not disqualify an organization from tax-exempt status so
long as the transaction was for fair market value and at arm's-length); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978) (opining that a hospital's lease of land to a physician group would not
inure to private benefit so long as the lease was at fair rental value); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS-501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (discussing the importance

of
executive
compensation
policies),
available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
governance practices.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/699F-HMWL; I.R.S. Form 990, Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. VI (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2013) (requesting detailed
information about the structure of exempt organizations' boards and management teams); I.R.S.
Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption, pt. V (OMB No. 1545-0056) (2013)
(requesting detailed information regarding compensation arrangements with applicant
organizations' board members and employees).
48. I.R.C. § 508(e)(1)(B).
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guidelines.4 9 One of these guidelines requires that section 501(c)(3)
charities "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or
in opposition to) any candidate for public office." 50 There is clear
evidence that the IRS has long taken its responsibility regarding this
mandate seriously, at least to the extent of articulating its view of the
law and making occasional efforts at seeming to enforce it.51 There is,
49. See generally Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative
Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013) (describing the Tea Party scandal and the
measures the IRS has sometimes taken to ensure that certain charitable organizations comply
with the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)).
50. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (specifying qualifications to receive taxdeductible charitable contributions). In contrast, social welfare organizations, listed in
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), which never qualify to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, and
which seem to have been the "charitable" misfits involved in the recent IRS scandal, may directly
engage in political campaign activities, so long as such activities are not their primary activity.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1990) (permitting "action organizations" to
qualify as exempt social welfare organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) under specified
conditions); Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332, 332 ("An organization primarily engaged in the
promotion of social welfare may participate in lawful political campaign activities involving the
nomination or election of public officials without adversely affecting its exempt status."). But see
I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013) (proposing regulations under which promotion of

social welfare would not include direct or indirect "candidate-related political activity," and
requesting comments on what portion of exempt organizations' activities must be devoted to
promoting social welfare and whether there should be additional limits on activities that do not).
51. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i), (iii)-(iv) (as amended in 2014) (defining
'action organizations" and withholding exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) from certain
organizations); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1988)
(reversing lower court's finding that appellee qualified as tax-exempt because its involvement in
rating and endorsing judicial candidates constituted prohibited political activity); United States
v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that I.R.S. strictly construes the
prohibition on participation by exempt organizations in any campaign for public office); Rev. Rul.
2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422-26 (providing comprehensive guidance regarding prohibition
against participation in political campaigns for public office under twenty-one separate factual
scenarios); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73, 74 (permitting an exempt educational organization to
conduct a public forum for qualified congressional candidates despite the prohibition on
participating in any political campaign so long as the forum does not demonstrate bias "for or
against" a particular candidate); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, 154 (permitting exempt
organizations to participate in certain "voter education" activities so long as they are conducted
in a "nonpartisan manner"); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200446033 (Nov. 12, 2004) (ruling that a
hospital that allowed employees to contribute to a political action campaign via payroll deduction
violated the prohibition on participation in campaign activity); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
199907021 (Feb. 19, 1999) (ruling that an exempt organization did not participate in a political
campaign when it engaged in efforts in support of certain policies and initiatives aligned with a
specific candidate's platform); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 199117001 (Apr. 26, 1991) (ruling that an
exempt organization engaged in prohibited campaign activity when it engaged in a mail-based
voter registration campaign because the materials were intended to influence voters to vote for
President Reagan); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Nov. 7, 1985) (finding that an organization
engages in prohibited campaign activity when it "rates numerous candidates for elective office");
DANIEL WERFEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS: INITIAL

ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/
0
Initial%20Assessment% 20and%2
OPlan% o20oP/o20Action.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RER3-
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as well, clear evidence that Congress is quite serious, on at least a
formal level, about keeping charities out of politics, in that it has given
the IRS authority to make termination assessments in the case of
"flagrant political expenditures" by section 501(c)(3) organizations. 52
On the other hand, how often, and under what circumstances, the IRS
actually chooses to impose what amounts to a death penalty on any
real charity-let alone a church-is quite another matter. The answer
is, surely, "Not often." It is clear, for example, that the IRS is
extremely leery about revoking any "real" church's tax-exempt
status. 53 There is, in addition, a real question about just how serious
the IRS is-or should be-about even rattling its saber along this
inherently messy and highly politically charged borderline.5 4
EYRF (detailing expedited approval process for long-pending applications); POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
COMPLIANCE

INITIATIVE,

INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERV.,

FINAL

REPORT

(2006),

available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2006paci-report 5-30-07.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HF43TPJN (finding 269 potential instances of contributions to political campaigns by section 501(c)(3)
exempt organizations between 2003 and 2005; 65 of the 92 closed cases involved prohibited
political activity).
I.R.C. § 6852.
52.
53.

See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I), at 1624 (1987) (noting insufficient IRS enforcement of

ban on political activity); Dan Gilgoff, Turning a Blind Eye, IRS Enables Church Politicking,
USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 2007, at 13A (reporting an IRS spokeswoman's estimation that only five
churches have ever lost their tax exemptions for engaging in political activity), available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070129/opledereligion62.art.htm,
archived
at http://perma.cc/69LQ-ASZ6.
54. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950
(W.D. Wis. 2013) (refusing to dismiss claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the IRS
for enforcing electioneering rules against charities generally but not against churches). Compare
Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the ConstitutionalNorm of Separationof Church and State Justify the
Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in PartisanPolitical Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447,
447 (2009) ("The inquisitions have begun."), Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participationin
Political Campaigns by CharitiesEssential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor
Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (2008) (noting the seriousness with which the IRS
purports to approach its enforcement obligations with respect to the prohibition on participation
in political campaigns), Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political
Campaign Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2007)
(suggesting that enforcement of the prohibition on participation in political campaigns is "by no
means uncommon"), and Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:
Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerousfor Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315 (2007) (suggesting
that the IRS has recently escalated its enforcement of the campaign prohibition in response to an
uptick in allegations of violations thereof), with Dallas Dean, A Little Rule That Goes a Long
Way: A Simplified Rule Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Ban on Campaign Intervention, 28 J.L. & POL.
307, 307-08 (2013) (arguing that, despite increased investigation of violations of the prohibition
on electioneering, imposition of sanctions is relatively spotty), Michael Hatfield, Ignore the
Rumors-Campaigning from the Pulpit Is Okay: Thinking Past the Symbolism of Section
501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 127 (2006) (citing minimal imposition of
sanctions for violation of the prohibition on campaign activity by churches and other exempt
organizations prior to 2006), Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical
Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibitionon Campaigningby Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733,
736-40 (2001) (citing many examples of electioneering by churches and associated personnel
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Another federal guideline requires that "no substantial part of
the activities" of a section 501(c)(3) charity be "carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."5 5
Though this guideline is obviously not absolute and may in certain
instances be legitimately sidestepped,5 6 here too the IRS has sought to
stake out a position and sometimes to appear to enforce it. 5
There are additional, less prominent federal restrictions on a
charity's behavior. There is, for example, the so-called commerciality
doctrine, which acknowledges that a charity may operate a
commercial business but insists that it be "in furtherance of the
organization's exempt purpose or purposes," and not vice versa.5 8

during the run-up to the 2000 election and the "slackness of enforcement" by the IRS), and

Daniel C. Willingham, "Are You Ready for Some (Political)Football?" How Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations Get Their Playing Time During Campaign Seasons, 28 AKRON TAx J. 83, 90 n.36
(2013) (suggesting that IRS enforcement of the prohibition on electioneering has been paltry
despite increasing involvement of exempt organizations in political campaigns).
55.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (prohibiting organizations that publish or
distribute statements in support or opposition of a political campaign from receiving taxdeductible charitable contributions).
56. See id. § 501(h) (permitting certain charities to elect to engage in specified amounts of
lobbying).
57.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i)-(ii), (iv) (as amended in 2014) (providing
that an organization that advocates specific action on specific legislative acts as a substantial
part of its activities fails the operational test and is ineligible for tax-exempt status); Regan v.
Tax'n with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) ("The issue in this case is not whether TWR
must be permitted to lobby, but whether Congress is required to provide it with public money
with which to lobby. . . . [W]e hold that it is not."); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972) (affirming IRS determination that nonprofit religious
corporation failed the organizational test because a substantial part of its operations consisted of
publishing a periodical that contained numerous articles "aiming to influence legislation by
appeal[ing] to the public to react to certain issues"); Kuper v. Comm'r, 332 F.2d 562, 562-63 (3d
Cir. 1964) (holding that an organization was not eligible for tax exemption when lobbying and
preparing to lobby for action on specific legislation constituted a substantial portion of the
organization's activities); League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Cl. Ct.
1960) (holding that an organization was not eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions when a substantial portion of its activities consisted of efforts to influence
legislation or discussing what positions to take on "questions of public interest").
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (as amended in 2014); see also Family Trust of Mass.,
Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that a commercial organization that
charged fees to serve as trustee for charitable trusts did not qualify for exempt status because its
commercial activity furthered non-exempt purposes more than insubstantially); Living Faith,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365, 372-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a nonprofit health ministry
was not operated in furtherance of exempt purposes when a substantial portion of its commercial
operations were effectively indistinguishable from similar services provided by non-exempt
organizations); Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 1984)
(articulating a two-part test for whether a nonprofit organization that engages in substantial
commercial activity qualifies for exemption); Partners in Charity, Inc. v. Comm'r, 141 T.C. 151
(2013) (holding that IRS correctly found that a nonprofit organization whose alleged purpose was
to provide down-payment assistance grants to homebuyers was ineligible for exemption because
its fee-for-service transactions with home sellers constituted substantial commercial activity not
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Likewise, federal law requires that a charity's charitable program be
"commensurate in scope with its financial resources."5 9
What all these requirements-the operational test, the ban on
private inurement, the rules relating to campaign involvement and
lobbying, the commerciality doctrine, and the "commensurate in
scope" standard-have in common is an insistence at the federal level,
often lacking at the state level, that a charity behave like a charity.
Nor is there the slightest doubt that the threat of IRS scrutiny often
affects the behavior of those who operate charities.6 0 For one thing,
having to deal with inquiries (or worse) from the IRS imposes on a
charity numerous costs, including the loss of time of both management
and staff and the accrual of legal and/or accounting fees. Extreme
cases may generate adverse publicity, which may in turn substantially
crimp contributions. 6 1 More prominent, if mostly hypothetical, is the
risk that the IRS will conclude that the charity no longer qualifies for
tax exemption, or receipt of tax-deductible charitable contributions. 62

C. FederalExcise Taxes
There is reason to believe that the all-or-nothing approach of
denying a charity's tax-exempt status is such a draconian penalty that

in furtherance of its charitable purposes); Church of Scientology v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 477
(1984) (upholding IRS finding that a religious organization failed the organizational test because
its principal means of distributing religious products and services was commercial in nature),
aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 806
(Cl. Ct. 1961) (holding that a nonprofit educational foundation that published religious literature
did not qualify as an exempt organization because its earnings from commercial activities
substantially outweighed expenditures on its alleged educational purpose).
59. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186, 187; see also John C. Colombo, Regulating
Commercial Activity by Exempt Charities:Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 341, 341-42 (2003) (proposing a renewed "commensurate-in-scope"
doctrine as a tool to resolve confusion about acceptable levels of commerciality of exempt
organizations); Sugin, supra note 27, at 921-22 (comparing the "commensurate-in-scope" test to
a charitable fiduciary's duty of fidelity to the entity's charitable purposes); see generally Jack B.
Siegel, Commensurate in Scope Myth, Mystery, or Ghost? (pts. I & II), TAX'N OF EXEMPTS, Nov.Dec. 2008, at 26, TAX'N OF EXEMPTS, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 8 (providing comprehensive overview of
the doctrine and its applicability in various contexts).
60. See, e.g., Steven B. Imhoof, Note, The Politics of Politicking Under IRC § 501(c)(3): A
Guide for Politically Active Churches, 5 NEXUS 97, 98-105 (2000) (summarizing statutes,
regulations, and jurisprudence governing political activity by exempt organizations for benefit of
'politically active churches").
61.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.

§ 620

cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,

2011) (discussing catastrophic impact of loss of exemption on nonprofit organizations).
62. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (setting qualifications for tax-exempt status); Alan L. Feld,
Rendering Unto Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for
Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931, 932-34 (2001). But see supra text
accompanying notes 53-54.
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the IRS is less inclined to use it than perhaps it should be. Added to
the traumatic, if not catastrophic, consequences for the charity
involved are chronic IRS understaffing and undertraining problems;
the unduly liberal and sometimes amorphous statutory and regulatory
standards for tax-exempt status; the tendency of the IRS to try to help
charities remediate their problems, rather than simply to enforce the
law; and the worry (often validated) that Congress will seek to bring
the IRS to heel if it ever goes "too far" in enforcing Congress' own laws
against one or more politically sensitive charities or classes of
charities. 63 Perhaps, in large part, for just these reasons, a number of
federal excise taxes seek to ensure that charities adhere, on their own,
to their charitable purposes.
Many of these excise taxes, particularly those to which private
foundations are subject, first appeared in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
They were born of congressional concern that the charitable sector,
although a huge beneficiary of tax incentives at all levels of
government, but particularly at the federal level, had become
essentially accountable to no one. 64 One can fairly say that many of
these taxes enforce the duty of loyalty and any number of other
fiduciary duties, albeit at the federal level. More generally, they
encourage those who run charities to operate them as charities.
There is, for example, an entire series of taxes on acts of "selfdealing,"6 5 very broadly defined, 66 in the case of transactions involving
private foundations.6 7 Just a few of the many transactions subject to

63.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 620 cmt. (c)(1) (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2011). For a thoughtfully annotated catalog of the many ways in which the IRS interacts with
and often seeks to help charities, see id. Reporter's Notes. The Tax Exempt and Government
Entities ("TE/GE") Division of the IRS is unique in that it relates not directly to the generation of
revenue, but to the regulation of charities: "Governed by complex, highly specialized provisions of
the tax law, the sector is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure that the entities
fulfill the policy goals that their tax exemption was designed to achieve." Id. § 620 cmt. a; see
generally Tax Exempt & Government EntitiesDivision At-a-Glance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-Entities-Division-At-a-Glance,
archived at
http://perma.cc/3V37-747S (last updated July 16, 2014).
64.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, pt. I, at 3-4, pt. III.A-.B, at 29-74

(1970) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION], available at https://ia600302.us.archive.org/26/
items/generalexplanati00jes 1670/generalexplanati00jes l670.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
6GR3-HRLJ (discussing tax reform measures).
65. I.R.C. § 4941.

66.

See id. § 4941(d).

67. Id. § 4941(a)(1). Very generally, a private foundation is a tax-exempt charity,
unaffiliated with any other tax-exempt charity, which is not funded with contributions or other
receipts from a broad segment of the public, other than certain so-called public charities, such as
churches, schools, and hospitals. See id. § 509(a). Often, private foundations are the creations of
a single individual, couple, or family.
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these taxes are sales and exchanges of property, leases, and loans
between the foundation and a "disqualified person." 68 In the case of
the "self-dealer," the tax is "equal to 10 percent of the amount involved
with respect to the act of self-dealing for each year (or part thereof)."6 9
In the case of a foundation manager, the tax is equal to 5 percent of
the same amount. 70 If the act is not "corrected" in a timely fashion,
there is an additional tax on the self-dealer "equal to 200 percent of
the amount involved."7 1 In addition, there is a tax "equal to 50 percent
of the amount involved" on any foundation manager who refuses to
agree to part or all of the correction. 72
Obviously Congress chose the persons on whom to impose these
taxes and the rates at which to impose them in the hopes of providing
serious deterrents to the misuse of charitable assets. Presumably
Congress believed that the parallel state-law deterrents were
inadequate, as they plainly are, at least in the case of not-for-profit
corporations. 73 In addition, Congress may have believed that limiting
the IRS to the all-or-nothing approach of revoking a charity's exempt
status was insufficiently flexible to be practically effective. The taxes
apply, however, even in the case of charitable trusts, on fact patterns
that would be slam-dunk violations of the state-law duty of loyalty.
Indeed, the taxes apply regardless of whether state-law enforcement
mechanisms work generally or even whether they already have
worked in the situation at hand. In the aftermath of the famous
Rothko case, for example, in which the New York courts imposed joint
and several personal liability exceeding $7 million on those found to
have enriched themselves at the expense of the foundation,7 4 the IRS
sought to impose punishing excise taxes on the very same individuals

68. Id. § 4941(d)(1)(A)-(B).
69. Id. § 4941(a)(1).
70. Id. § 4941(a)(2). The tax applies, however, only to a foundation manager who
participated in an act of self-dealing "knowing that it [was] such an act." Id. Even then, it applies
only if the manager's participation was "willful" and not "due to reasonable cause." Id. In any
event, the tax on the manager cannot exceed $20,000 for "any one act of self-dealing."
Id. § 4941(c)(2).
71. Id. § 4941(b)(1).
72. Id. § 4941(b)(2). Here, too, the tax cannot exceed $20,000 for "any one act of selfdealing." Id. § 4941(c)(2).

73.

See Johnny Rex Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions Underlying the Federal Excise

Taxation of Compensation Paid by Charities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 53, 69 (2010) ("[T]he
most basic assumption of section 4941 [is that r]egulating fiduciary behavior through the
enforcement of state law fiduciary duties is insufficient.").
74. Estate of Rothko v. Reis (In re Estate of Rothko), 372 N.E.2d 291, 294-95, 300 (N.Y.
1977).
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to the tune of more than $20 million each. 75 Less sensationally, the
IRS can and does use the taxes to deter and penalize the payment of
excessive compensation to foundation managers. 76 The taxes on selfdealing more or less track, but substantially fortify, enforcement of
state trust law concepts of the duty of loyalty. As to not-for-profit
corporations, moreover, they supply a body of law virtually missing at
the state level, and to that extent, frequently apply to transactions
that would have attracted little or no scrutiny otherwise.7 7
Private foundations also face federal excise taxes on "taxable
expenditures."78 These are a motley group of transactions, to which we
shall return,79 but for now it is sufficient to note that the term
includes certain types of grants directly to individuals, grants to nonqualifying organizations,
and, perhaps
most informatively,
expenditures "for any purpose other than one specified in section
170(c)(2)(B)." 8 0 Plainly, the primary target of the tax is activity that is,
or arguably is, not "charitable," at least in the sense that federal tax
law specifies. Similar taxes apply with respect to donor-advised

75.
Estate of Reis v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1016, 1017 (1986) (more than $21 million); Stamos v.
Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1451, 1451 (1986) (more than $23 million).
76. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9008001 (Feb. 23, 1990). Under the initial wording of
the statute, payment of any compensation to a disqualified person seems to attract the taxes on
self-dealing. See I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(D). Nonetheless, such payments avoid taxation in the
ordinary course, i.e., whenever they are "for personal services which are reasonable and
necessary to carrying out the exempt purpose of the private foundation" and the
"compensation . . . is not excessive." Id. § 4941(d)(2)(E); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4941(d)-2(c)(4),
53.4941(d)-3(c)(1)-(2) exs. (1)-(3) (providing personal or banking services is not self-dealing if
services are reasonable and compensation is not excessive); Rev. Rul. 74-591, 1974-2 C.B. 385
(pension to disqualified person not excessive); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200135047 (June 7, 2001)
(ruling that fee compensation arrangement was not self-dealing); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8226149
(Apr. 5, 1982) (ruling that specific payments would not constitute self-dealing if not excessive). In
contrast, payment of compensation to a disqualified person for non-personal services, such as
custodial services provided by a corporation wholly owned by a foundation director, is subject to
taxation notwithstanding the reasonableness of the compensation. See Madden v. Comm'r, 74
T.C.M. (CCH) 440, 449 (1997) (stating that payment of compensation for custodial services is
subject to taxation notwithstanding reasonableness).
77.
See Ellen P. Aprill, Reconciling Nonprofit Self-Dealing Rules, ABA REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4-5, 7-23, 27-34) available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2327986, archived at http://perma.cc/X32X-A79X
(explaining and analyzing the self-dealing rules); Buckles, supranote 73, at 66-68 (providing an
example in which compliance with state law does not shield the actor from the excise tax).
78. I.R.C. § 4945.
79. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
80. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(3)-(5). Section 170(c)(2)(B) refers to corporations, trusts, and
community chests, funds, and foundations "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes."
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funds,8 1 as well as with respect to their donors, advisors, and
management. 82
Public charities, too, now face a series of excise taxes on "excess
benefit transactions." 83 These taxes, too, mimic both the duty of
loyalty8 4 and the duty to administer the charity in accordance with its
terms and governing law. 85 They apply to a whole range of
transactions, including, for example, the payment of excessive
compensation to a covered charity's managers.8 6 In particular, the
recipient faces a tax equal to "25 percent of the excess benefit."8 7 If the
transaction is not "corrected" in a timely fashion, the recipient faces
an additional tax "equal to 200 percent of the excess benefit."" In
addition, "any organization manager [who participates] in the excess
benefit transaction" faces a tax equal to "10 percent of the excess
benefit," unless the manager did not know that the transaction was an
excess benefit transaction, the participation was "not willful," or the
participation was "due to reasonable cause."8 9
Other excise taxes, also sometimes imposed at punishing rates,
penalize not only self-dealing but a wide range of prohibited activities
by charities, as well as transactions between charities and various
groups of people that include, but often extend far beyond, the
fiduciaries who run them. One such tax is the tax on "political
expenditures."90 The statute defines political expenditures in language

81.

Id. § 4966.

82. Id. § 4967. Sections 4966 and 4967 were both enacted by the Pension Protection Act of
2006.
83. Id. § 4958. Section 4958 was enacted by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (1996).
84. See Buckles, supra note 73, at 82-87 ("The behavior of fiduciaries that is required to
escape liability for payment of excise tax is similar, but not identical, to what one would expect of
directors exercising their duties of loyalty and care under state law.").
85. See Buckles, supra note 27, at 233-34 (describing incentives created by excise taxes).
Perhaps this is just another way of saying that they also ensure that the charity actually
dedicates its resources to the public benefit and enforce the federal rule against private
inurement. See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private
Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 639-49 (2000) ("It is difficult to know
whether adoption of the phrase, 'excess benefit transaction' in section 4958 was intended to
restate or redefine the law of private inurement."); Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders
and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 750-52 (2007) (discussing the
prohibition against private inurement). Indeed, there are regulations as to when a charity's tax
exemption should be revoked for engaging in an excess benefit transaction. E.g., Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii) (2014).
86. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 4958(a)(1).
88. Id. § 4958(b).
89. Id. § 4958(a)(2). "With respect to any 1 excess benefit transaction," however, this tax
cannot exceed $20,000. Id. § 4958(d)(2).
90. Id. § 4955. Section 4955 was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1987.
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virtually identical to that of section 501(c)(3), which has already
essentially prohibited them: "any amount paid or incurred ... in any
participation in, or intervention in (including the publication or
distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office." 91 Indeed, the tax applies
only in the case of expenditures by a section 501(c)(3) entity. 92 The
basic tax is relatively benign: it requires the charity to pay a tax equal
to 10 percent of the amount of the expenditure; 93 it also requires
management to pay a tax equal to 2.5 percent.9 4 If, however, the
expenditure is not "corrected" in a timely fashion, the tax on the
charity rises to 100 percent of the amount of the expenditure,9 5 and
the tax on management rises to 50 percent. 96
As we have already seen,9 7 there is another tax on "taxable
expenditures,"9 8 which applies only to private foundations. As to these
charities, the tax explicitly extends, subject to various exceptions, to
any amount paid or incurred "to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to
attempt, to influence legislation," or "to influence the outcome of any
specific public election, or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter
registration drive."99 In the case of public charities, a special tax
penalizes "excess expenditures to influence legislation."10 0 Congress
seems so intent on at least pretending to want the IRS to police these
sorts of activities that it has even enacted a tax on charities whose
lobbying expenditures disqualify them from exemption under section
501(c)(3).101

It is true that, as to both campaigning and lobbying, state law
has long been generally to the effect that such activities cannot

91. Id. § 4955(d)(1).
92. Id. § 4955(a)(1).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 4955(a)(2). The tax on management applies, however, only to a manager who
agreed to the expenditure. Id. Even then, it applies only if the manager's agreement was "willful"
and not "due to reasonable cause." Id. In any event, the tax on management cannot exceed
$5,000 for "any 1 political expenditure." Id. § 4955(c)(2).
95. Id. § 4955(b)(1).
96. Id. § 4955(b)(2). Here, too, the tax on management applies only to a manager who
'refused to agree to part or all of the correction." Id. Likewise, the tax on management for refusal
to correct in a timely fashion cannot exceed $10,000 for "any 1 political expenditure."
Id. § 4955(c)(2).
97. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing federal excise tax on "taxable
expenditures").
98. I.R.C. § 4945.
99. Id. § 4945(d)(1)-(2).
100. Id. § 4911. Section 4911 was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
101. Id. § 4912. Section 4912 was enacted by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
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constitute the gist of an entity's charitable purpose. 102 Yet the lines in
this area have always been fuzzy and at least certain kinds of rather
hard-core advocacy seem by now to have won the stamp of charitable
approval at the state level.103 As between these state "rules" and the
bristling federal arsenal threatening loss of tax exemption and
disqualification to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, as
well as staggering excise taxes, it seems fair to say that federal law
now dominates.
Other federal excise taxes mimic aspects of state law other
than the duty of loyalty, although perhaps not intentionally. There is,
for example, a federal excise tax on the "excess business holdings" of a
private foundation.104 It is possible that a charity's decision to acquire
or retain a concentrated position in a certain business is the result of a
violation of the duty of loyalty on the part of one or more of the
charity's fiduciaries. This, however, is certainly not always the case.
Instead, when a charity holds a concentrated investment position, it is
far more likely to be merely a violation of the fiduciary's duty to invest
as a prudent investor, i.e., a failure to diversify. Though the tax seems
to have been enacted primarily as a way to limit charities' ability to
engage directly in large-scale noncharitable business operations,10 5 a
clear by-product is to reinforce and/or to create a duty on the part of
charitable fiduciaries to diversify their charitable portfolios.
There is another series of federal excise taxes on investments
that "jeopardize" a private foundation's charitable purpose.1 06 Yet
another federal tax applies upon termination of private foundation
status.10 7 Both taxes mimic the state-law fiduciary duty to administer

102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. 1 (2003) (promotion of a political party
is not charitable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. k (1959) (a trust to promote a
political party is not charitable); 6 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, §§ 38.7.8, 38.7.9
(noting that promoting a political party is not charitable but promoting legislation may be).
103. See, e.g., Dep't of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Tex. Lottery Comm'n, 698 F.3d 239,
244 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The Commission has not pointed to any formal opinion in which it has
interpreted the charitable purpose requirement as establishing a wholesale prohibition on
political advocacy."); 6 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, §§ 38.7.1 (temperance), 38.7.6
(unpopular causes), 38.7.8 (women's and minorities' causes), 38.7.9 (law reform). Interestingly,
"the [federal] prohibition was not the product of a change in public opinion, but instead appears
to have been proposed by [Senator Lyndon Baines] Johnson as a way to squelch certain unsavory
campaign tactics targeted at him by a few tax-exempt entities." O'Daniel, supra note 54, at 740.
104. I.R.C. § 4943.
105. Legislative history indicates congressional concern that managing a large business
enterprise might distract a charity's management from the charitable tasks at hand. See
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 64, pt. III.A.4, at 40-41 (giving examples in which business
and non-charitable purposes predominated foundation activities).
106. I.R.C. § 4944.
107. Id. § 507.
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a charity in accordance with its terms and applicable law, the duty of
care or prudence, and the duty to control and protect the charity's
property; in short, the duty to preserve a charity's ability to "do"
charity.
And then there is the tax on "unrelated business income."10 8
This is a tax on all income that a charity derives from any trade or
business "the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from
the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes
of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such
organization

of its charitable .

.

. purpose."10 9 It was enacted

in

response to claims by tax-paying businesses of unfair competition by
charities (e.g., when N.Y.U. owned Mueller Macaroni). 110 Under the
regulations, a trade or business
is "related" to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the conduct of the
business activities has causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes (other
than through the production of income); and it is "substantially related," for purposes of
section 513, only if the causal relationship is a substantial one."

Examples of unrelated business income are catering services,
condominium rentals, and advertising income. Thus, the unrelated
business tax helps to ensure that the charity is fully committed to the
accomplishment of charitable, rather than commercial, activity and to
the accomplishment of its own particular charitable purpose.
A fascinating study dealing specifically with the unrelated
business tax casts a very bright light on just how thoroughly federal
tax law now permeates the administration of charities. 1 12 According to
this study, certain nonprofits during the period 1995-1997 reported
losses on their taxable activities in excess of $1 billion, on $4 billion of
revenues. 113 In contrast, these same nonprofits reported profits in
excess of $50 billion on their tax-exempt activities. It seems safe to
108. Id. §§ 511-515. The tax on unrelated business income was enacted in the Revenue Act
of 1950.
109. Id. § 513(a). The IRS has ruled that the relevant charitable purpose must be that of the
charity itself, not some other charitable purpose. Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, pt. III, at 36 (1950) ("The problem at which the tax on
unrelated business income is directed here is primarily that of unfair competition."); S. REP. NO.
81-2375, at 27 (1950) (explaining application of tax to unrelated business income); Susan RoseAckerman, Unfair Competition and CorporateIncome Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1017-22
(1982) (describing the tax and fairness implications of N.Y.U.'s ownership of Mueller Macaroni).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (1983).
112. Robert J. Yetman, Tax-Motivated Expense Allocations by Nonprofit Organizations, 76
ACCT. REV. 297, 309-10 (2001).
113. Id. at 298. Charities with unrelated business taxable income must file not only the
regular Form 990 but also Form 990-T. Unlike the former, the latter is not subject to public
disclosure. The author of the study, however, convinced 703 nonprofits to provide him with their
Forms 990-T voluntarily. Id. at 300, 303.
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assume that those running charities, like those running taxable
businesses, would promptly jettison activities that consistently yielded
losses-especially those that were not truly charitable and thus must
have been undertaken primarily, or perhaps even exclusively, to
generate revenues. These charities, however, at least according to
their returns, kept throwing good money after bad at their "taxable"
activities. Not surprisingly, the study concludes that what was
actually going on was that these charities were allocating expenses
from their tax-exempt activities to their taxable activities to reduce or
eliminate the unrelated business tax.114 We all know just how
carefully most businesses consider tax consequences and adjust their
behavior-or at least their accounting-to minimize them. It seems
that in many instances charities that are subject to the unrelated
business tax are no less amenable to "tax planning."
Yet another federal excise tax imposes on private foundations
certain annual minimum distribution requirements. 115 To avoid this
tax, a private foundation must distribute annually at least five
percent of the net fair market value of its investment assets for the
accomplishment of purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B). 116 If
distributions fall short of this amount, the tax is equal to 30 percent of
the shortfall. 117 If the shortfall remains unsatisfied until the earlier of
the mailing of a notice of deficiency with respect to the tax or its

114. The study makes no claim that these misallocations failed to comply with applicable
tax law. Surely, however, any system that imposes a tax on "unrelated business income" ought
not allow entities subject to the tax to evade it with impunity simply by reallocating expenses
from tax-exempt activities to taxable activities. Part of the problem is a vague regulation that
unhelpfully permits allocation of dual-use expenses on any "reasonable basis."
Treas.
Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(c) (2002). In addition, at least one of the IRS's own more specific positions has
not found support in the courts. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9149006 (Aug. 12, 1991) (portion
allocated to taxable income must be based on total availability for use), with Rensselaer
Polytechnic Inst. v. Comm'r, 732 F.2d 1058, 1060-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (allocation may be based on
actual use). Thus, it may be that expenses relating to a facility that mostly sits empty but that is
occasionally used for the production of taxable income can "legitimately" be allocated
disproportionately to the taxable income, notwithstanding the fact that the charity acquired the
facility for its tax-exempt purposes, to which that facility is essential. It would seem, however,
that one cannot fairly attribute these charities' successes with tax-exempt activities and notable
lack thereof with taxable activities solely to this particular glitch.
115. I.R.C. § 4942 (2012); see generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation
Excise Tax on Failureto Distribute Income GenerallyApply to "PrivateFoundation Substitutes"?
Evaluating the Taxation of Various Models of CharitableEntities, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 493, 50309 (2 0 1 0) (explaining the state of current law).
116. I.R.C. § 4942(a), (c)-(e).
117. Id. § 4942(a). There is an exception for an "operating foundation." Id. § 4942(a)(1).
There is another exception when the failure is due to an error in the valuation of assets if the
error "was not willful and was due to reasonable cause," the failure is corrected in a timely
fashion, and the private foundation notifies the IRS. Id. § 4942(a)(2).
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assessment, the tax rises to one-hundred percent of the shortfall.118
There is no similar excise tax on public charities.119 Indeed, state law
has rarely, if ever, required charities to pay out a certain amount each
year. 120 Still, to be "charitable," an entity must "do" charity. Some sort
of distribution of funds, provision of goods or services, programming,
dissemination of knowledge, or the like seems almost essential.
Whether by intent or by accident, this particular tax thus encourages
charities to behave like charities.
In sharp contrast, yet another federal excise tax imposes on
private foundations a tax "equal to 2 percent of ... net investment
income." 121 Taxing a charity on investment income seems directly
contrary to encouraging it to "do" charity, at least on anything other
than a very short-term basis. The sharp discontinuity of this
particular tax with any substantive policy involving the regulation of
charity no doubt lies in the fact that it was enacted simply as a way to
pay for the costs of policing charities and charitable fiduciaries at the
federal level. 122
As if the number of excise taxes that may or may not intrude
into the life of a charity were not sufficiently alarming, the rates at
which they can apply are often frightening. Moreover, in certain
instances the imposition of a tax would, all by itself, justify revocation
of the charity's tax-exempt status. Given these stakes, a number of
states have enacted statutes that bar charities from engaging in any
activity that would generate a federal excise tax. 123 It has been argued
that the existence of potentially devastating taxes and the possibility
of an effective death sentence by denial of federal tax-exempt status
118. Id. § 4942(b), (j)(1).
119. See Buckles, supra note 27, at 232 ("[U]naffiliated public charities are not subject to a
payout rule.").
120. The entire thrust of current state law is to ensure that charities do not overspend and
thereby impair their endowments. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 4(a) (2006)
("UPMIFA") (subject to contrary settlor intent, charitable institution "may appropriate for
expenditure or accumulate so much of an endowment fund as the institution determines is
prudent" (emphasis added)); id. § 4(d) ("The appropriation for expenditure in any year of an
amount greater than seven percent of the fair market value of an endowment fund . . . creates a
rebuttable presumption of imprudence."); id. § 4 cmt. (explaining purpose and scope of revisions).
Virtually every state has enacted UPMIFA. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note
1, § 37.3.8 n.25 (5th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2013) (listing states that have enacted UPMIFA). See

generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Probing UPMIFA: The Mysteries of the Uniform Act in Light of
Federal Tax and State Charity Laws and Concepts, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 281, 282-85
(2011) (explaining the application of UPMIFA).
121. I.R.C. § 4940.
122. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 29 (Comm. Print 1970).
123. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16102 (West 2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8
(McKinney 2014).
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impair the ability of state attorneys general to do their jobs in
enforcing charitable fiduciary obligations.124 Certainly the extraction
of taxes shifts to the federal government assets previously dedicated to
charity, thereby limiting the ability of state attorneys general to
obtain or even to seek damages or restitution. 125 Moreover, the taxes
can apply to comparatively trivial sorts of self-dealing, or even to
actions that would not be actionable under state law. 12 6 Given the fact
that most state attorneys general have, to date, seen fit to commit
virtually no resources to policing charities and their fiduciaries,
whether any of these inconsistencies matters much is doubtful. The
impression remains, however, that federal law is steadily crowding out
state law. 127

D. FederalCollection and Disseminationof Information
About Charities
Surely the most frequently invasive, but perhaps also among
the most effective, of the federal intrusions into the realm of
regulating charity are the various annual reporting requirements.
Forms 990 and 990-PF are neither easy nor quick to complete. 128 They
demand-and reveal-detailed information about a charity's
organizational structure, policies, transactions with related parties,
salaries and other forms of employee benefits, fundraising expenses
and overhead, engagement in lobbying or political campaign activities,

124. See Buckles, supra note 40, at 691-92 (arguing that federal enforcement limits
remedies available to state attorneys general).
125. Id. at 691.
126. See id. at 692-93 (private foundation termination tax may force "transfer of assets from
a charitable entity to the federal government, notwithstanding that charity fiduciaries may have
satisfied general state law standards of loyalty. . . . The IRS has the power to revoke the entity's
federal income tax exemption, even if the consequent income tax liability is vastly greater than
the amount of private inurement involved.").
127.

11,

See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT

ORGS., supra note

§ 130

cmt. e(1), illus. 6.
128. Form 990, for example, consists of twelve pages of very detailed questions. I.R.S. Form
990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2013). There is a
shorter form, Form 990-EZ, currently available for certain charities with gross receipts of less
than $200,000 and total assets of less than $500,000. It, too, is available to the public. Certain
charities with gross receipts of less than $50,000 may file an annual electronic notice, Form 990N, an e-Postcard. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CAT. NO. 64888C, 2013 INSTRUCTIONS FOR

FORM 990-EZ 1-2 (2013). For some charities there is no filing requirement. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)
(2012) (exempting churches, organizations whose gross annual receipts normally do not exceed
$5,000, and exclusively religious activities of religious orders). See generally John Montague, The
Law and Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the Form 990 Exemption, 35
CARDozo L. REV. 203 (2013).
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and ownership of conservation easements. 129 This information not only
goes to the IRS 130 but also is readily available to the public.131 The
application for exemption, Form 1023, is itself available to the
public. 132 It seems hard to believe that having to answer such specific
questions publicly would not affect charities' primary behavior, even
in ways that they believe are not necessarily in their own best
interests. 1 33
As the primary receptacle of all sorts of returns and other
information filed by charities nationwide, the federal government is in
a prime position to help the states enforce their own laws by sharing
information. Unfortunately, much of what the federal government has
actually done seems, in fact, to have limited the ability of state
officials to obtain such information. 134
129. Unsurprisingly, the IRS has a "Governance Check Sheet" for use by its revenue agents
in examining section 501(c)(3) charities. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CAT. No. 54282M, FORM
14114 (2009). This check sheet is incredibly demanding-and intrusive-asking, among many
other things, how often a quorum of voting members met; whether the authorized body relied on
comparability data in making compensation determinations; whether disclosed conflicts of
interest were handled in accordance with the organization's written conflict of interest policy;
whether the full board reviewed the Form 990; whether an independent accountant's report was
prepared and reviewed by the full board; and whether the organization has and adheres to a
written policy for document retention and destruction. Id.
130. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1).
131. Id. § 6104(d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-1(a) (as amended in 2003). GuideStar, at
http://www.guidestar.org, and Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics,
http://nces.urban.org, provide easy public access to these filings. See Brody, Sunshine and
Shadows, supra note 37, at 206 (noting the profound impact of these organizations on public
access to charity tax reporting). Filed forms are also available from the IRS. Id.
132. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A).
133. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVT ENTITIES, THE APPROPRIATE
ROLE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION GOOD

GOVERNANCE ISSUES 38 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege-act-rpt7.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/S5YV-PZUB (suggesting that the wording of questions in publicly
available forms causes charities to adopt practices allowing them to give favorable answers to
those questions, even when the practices are inappropriate for their own situations). There is,
however, some evidence that certain types of data reported on these forms are pervasively
incorrect. At least two studies have found, for example, that charities widely underreport their
fundraising expenses. Elizabeth K. Keating, Linda M. Parsons & Andrea Alston Roberts,
Misreporting Fundraising: How Do Nonprofit Organizations Account for Telemarketing
Campaigns?, 83 ACCT. REV. 417, 419 (2008); Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J.
Yetman, Expense Misreporting in Nonprofit Organizations, 81 ACCT. REV. 399, 401 (2006); see
also William P. Barrett, CharitiesFudge Their FundraisingCosts? Shocking!, FORBES (Feb. 22,
2012, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampbarrett/2012/02/22/charities-fudge-theirfundraising-costs-shocking, archived at http://perma.cc/V7KC-RQM8 (noting that many charities
regularly hide politically unappealing costs through dubious accounting practices).
134.

See

PRINCIPLES

OF

THE

LAW

OF

CHARITABLE

NONPROFIT

ORGS.,

supra note

11, § 130 cmt. e(2) (noting federal privacy constraints on I.R.S. information sharing and stating
that efforts to improve information sharing have made slow progress); NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE
CHARITY OFFICIALS, COMMENTS TO PROPOSED REGULATIONS NUMBER REG-140108-08,

(2011), available at http://www.charitableplanning.com/cpc_1827385-l.pdf,

at 2

archived at http://
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E. Federal "Education"
The federal impact on state enforcement of charities and their
fiduciaries is not limited to the passage of laws, the imposition of
taxes, and the promulgation of regulations that effectively supersede
state laws seeking to achieve roughly the same objectives. The IRS
has also undertaken a massive role in "educating" charities and those
who run them. Indeed, it has been noted that "[t]he role of the
Internal Revenue Service with respect to charities is an anomaly
within the agency, whose overall function is to ensure that taxpayers
pay the taxes they owe." 135 Nor does the IRS limit itself to guidance on
what forms to file and when and how to file them. The IRS website
has a page specifically dedicated to charities.136 A document entitled
"Governance and Related Topics-501(c)(3) Organizations" offers
specific suggestions as to how a charity should develop its mission;
what its organizational documents, governing body, and financial
statements should look like; what sorts of governance and
management policies it should have; and how it should deal with
transparency and accountability when keeping minutes, making
investments, and handling whistleblowers. 137 The forms themselves
demand vastly more information than the IRS needs, strictly
speaking, to do its job. 138 Even when it requests clearly required
information, the IRS educates charities and those who run them about

perma.cc/YW3K-WKKD (noting that the Pension Protection Act (2006) imposed further
restrictions on information-sharing between the I.R.S. and state governments).
135.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.

§

620 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 3,

2011).
136. Tax Information for Charities & Other Non-Profits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits,
archived at http://perma.cc/D5H2-H8LZ
(last
updated Sept. 9, 2014).
137. Governance and Related Topics-501(c)(3) Organizations,INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
(Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance-practices.pdf,
archived at http://
perma.cc/ S3PV-EVPD.
138. See Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements-Governance (Form 990,
Part V7), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/ExemptOrganizations-Annual-Reporting-Requirements-Governance-(Form-990,-Part-VI),
archived at
http://perma.cc/8F4Z-373U (last updated May 13, 2014) (stating that although the policies and
practices required by Section VI of Form 990 are not required by law, organizations are
nonetheless required to answer all questions). The Frequently Asked Questions section of the
IRS nonprofit webpage explicitly acknowledges that many of the governance questions in Part VI
of Form 990 go well beyond actual statutory requirements. Id. Possible examples include: "Did
the organization contemporaneously document the meetings held or written actions undertaken
during the year by [t]he governing body?"; "Did the organization have a written whistleblower
policy?"; and "Did the organization have a written document retention and destruction policy?"
I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. VI (OMB No. 1545-0047)
(2013).
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how they are "supposed to" behave, at least if they want, as most
taxpayers do, to take the path of least resistance with the IRS.

IV. DEVICES FOR THE BENEFIT OF CHARITY
Professor Scott attributed the survival of trusts and, more
generally, their ubiquity to their flexibility. 1 39 That flexibility
continues to this day under state law, perhaps to an even greater
extent than ever before. Federal tax law, however, severely limits the
options of a donor who wishes to split the beneficial interest in a trust
between charity and private parties, ordinarily family members.
Under federal tax law, only a favored few types of trusts entitle such a
donor to the full fruits of his or her philanthropy, i.e., tax deductions.
These days, such a donor must utilize one or more of only five
hothouse hybrids never previously known to humankind, and to this
day known only to federal tax cognoscenti. According to the Internal
Revenue Code, the only currently acceptable options are: (1) a
charitable remainder annuity trust ("CRAT"), (2) a charitable
remainder unitrust ("CRUT"), (3) a pooled income fund ("PIF"), (4) a
charitable lead annuity trust ("CLAT"), or (5) a charitable lead
unitrust ("CLUT"). 140 Anything else would result in at least two tax
disasters: (1) no income tax deduction-not even for the value of the
portion of the trust irrevocably committed to charity-and (2) no
transfer tax deduction, meaning that the donor would be required to
pay an "excise tax" for the privilege of benefitting charity via a device
not approved of by federal law, or at least that the donor would
squander a portion of his or her unified credit equivalent.
There are numerous consequences. Planning for philanthropy
is now straitjacketed by federal tax law. Those who cannot or do not
want to benefit charity through outright transfers or the creation of
purely charitable trusts must find their way through the eye of the
federal tax needle. This has given birth to an entirely new estate
planning subspecialty: enabling, planning, correcting, and undoing
split-interest charitable trusts.
One of the hothouse hybrids, the PIF, requires charities, or at
least those many charities that choose not to exclude themselves from
the possibility of receiving funding via a PIF, to establish and
maintain one or more of their own. This requires charities to add staff

139. See 1 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 1.1 (5th ed. 2006).
140. See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(2)(A), 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2) (2012) (providing deductions for income,
estate, and gift taxes, respectively).
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and/or hire yet more lawyers and accountants. This is simply another
cost, imposed by the federal government, of being a charity.
The rules regarding what qualifies as a permissible splitinterest charitable trust are mind-numbingly complex. No doubt the
law is full of complexity, but the split-interest rules are so complex
that the stereotypical general practitioner, even with a passing
knowledge of wills and trusts, often seems unable to ensure
qualification under the federal tax rules. Thus, the cases involving
badly conceived or badly designed split-interest charitable trusts
continue to pile up. In the interest of "saving taxes," courts have
become all too willing to torture perfectly clear language and to
presume intentions for which there is absolutely no evidence. 14 1
Virtually every state now has legislation authorizing trust reformation
to save taxes generally, 142 and many have statutes aimed directly at
salvaging either the charitable deduction or split-interest charitable
trusts. 143
Most of those who have ever been confined to a straitjacket
have eventually concluded that they would rather not be. So also here:
many of both the charities and the private parties who have found
themselves constrained by the straitjackets of federally approved
split-interest trusts have eventually concluded that they would rather
take their marbles and go home. Thus, a cottage industry now
concerns itself with extracting beneficiaries from split-interest trusts,
or at least making their confinement less odious, while ensuring them
that the tax consequences of their new-found freedom or flexibility
remain tolerable. 144
Again, however, the claim here is not that the federal tax rules
relating to split-interest trusts are bad, unjustified, or even
unnecessarily intrusive on state prerogatives. The split-interest rules
were yet another part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. With them,
141. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supranote 1, § 33.5 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing cases
in which courts have allowed postmortem restructuring of trusts to achieve more favorable
taxation, despite such trusts' having been properly structured to match settlors' apparent
intentions).
142. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 ("To achieve the settlor's tax objectives, the court
may modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor's probable
intention."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

12.2

(2003) ("A donative document may be modified, in a manner that does not violate the donor's
probable intention, to achieve the donor's tax objectives.").
143. See 5 SCOTT, FRATCHER & ASCHER, supra note 1, § 33.5 nn. 20-21 (5th ed. 2008)
(cataloging state statutory provisions for salvaging charitable deductions generally and splitinterest trusts in particular).
144. See M. CARR FERGUSON, JAMES J. FREELAND & MARK L. ASCHER, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS & BENEFICIARIES §§ 11.02[A] n.17, 11.03[A] n.18, 12.04 (3d ed.

1999 & Supp. 2014).
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Congress deliberately sought to correct a perceived and, one can only
imagine, real abuse under state law.14 5 The poster child that launched
the split-interest rules was: "Income to Wife for life, remainder to the
University of Texas; Wife to serve as trustee." The self-interested
beneficiary/trustee would then stack or otherwise mismanage
investments and/or payouts in such a way as to favor herself,
sometimes grotesquely. With no one minding the store at the state
attorney general's office, she would inevitably get away with it; the
University of Texas would end up holding an essentially empty bag;
and the federal government, having allowed at least one tax deduction
upon the creation of the trust for the supposed value of the charitable
remainder, would have substantially overpaid for what little remained
for the University of Texas. In 1969, Congress decided that it had lost
enough tax revenue in this way and took action more or less
reasonably designed to address the problem.14 6 The end result,
however, is that, by effectively eliminating the simpler sorts of devices
that fiduciaries once often abused, the split-interest rules are yet
another, albeit indirect, layer of federal regulation of both the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and the fiduciary duty of impartiality. In
addition, the split-interest rules have indisputably made the field of
charitable giving vastly more complex and expensive.
V. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

Although hardly at the center of either charity or charitable
giving, conservation easements, too, are beginning to leave their own
indelible impressions on the law of charity. In addition to the five
hothouse hybrid trusts already discussed, there is another way to
obtain federal tax deductions for gifts to charity in which private
parties share an interest: carving out a conservation easement for
charity,1 4 7 such as the right to block all or certain types of
development on the subservient property. Such an easement must be
"exclusively for conservation purposes" and "granted in perpetuity."1 4 8
145.

See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., supra note

122, at 83-84 (stating that the Act changed the law to prevent charitable contribution deductions
far exceeding the actual value of remainders going to charity).
146. Id.

147. I.R.C.

§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2012). For excellent analysis of conservation easements, see

Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for
Federally Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 1: The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L.J. 473 (2010), and Nancy A McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National
Perpetuity Standardsfor Federally Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 2: Comparison to
State Law, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1 (2011).

148. I.R.C.

§ 170(h)(1)(C), (2)(C).
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The relevant statute is unequivocal, if also repetitive, in the latter
regard: "A contribution shall not be treated as exclusively for
conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in
perpetuity."1 4 9 In addition, the easement must bar "extraction or
removal of minerals by any surface mining method."15 0
Perhaps it is obvious, but these are seriously-perhaps even
extremely-demanding requirements. And there are good reasons why
they should be. First, the intent of both the federal government and,
presumably, the person granting the easement is that it be effective in
preserving the current state of the land or building in question.15 1
Second, by granting deductions for the amount by which the easement
supposedly decreases the property's fair market value, to say nothing
of the additional estate tax exclusion, 1 52 the federal government in
effect pays for a substantial portion of the easement. 153
In the case of buildings in registered historic districts, the
statute itself seeks to provide additional assurance of enforcement,
according to the easement's terms, by requiring that the donee
organization have "a purpose of environmental protection, land
conservation, open space preservation, or historic preservation" and
that it have "the resources to manage and enforce the restriction and a
commitment to do SO."154 The regulations seemingly extend the latter
requirement to donations of all conservation easements by defining an
"eligible donee" as an entity that has both the "commitment to protect
the conservation purposes of the donation" and "the resources to
enforce the restrictions." 15 5 Any charity that allows modification of an
easement in such a way as to increase the value of the subservient
property (if held by a private party) without receiving in exchange
149. Id. § 170(h)(5)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(a) (as amended in 2009); Wachter v.
Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 7 (2014) (holding that an easement failed to qualify for federal tax
purposes because North Dakota law limited it to 99 years).
150. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(B)(i). There is, however, an exception when the mineral rights have
already been separated from the ownership of the surface estate and the probability of surface
mining actually occurring on the property is so remote as to be negligible. Id. § 170(h)(5)(B)(ii).
151. See Ann Taylor Schwing, Perpetuity Is Forever, Almost Always: Why It Is Wrong to
Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual ConservationEasements, 37 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 217, 235 (2013) ("Federal tax law mandates that recipients of federal tax-deductible
conservation easements must have a commitment to protect the conservation purpose . . . and
the resources to enforce them.").
152. I.R.C. § 2031(c).
153. See Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure: In Search of
Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-10 (2012) (estimating revenue loss of $3.6
billion from federal income tax deductions for individual conservation easement donors during
the period 2003-2008).
154. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B)(ii).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (as amended in 2009).
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consideration of at least equal value fails to carry out the charitable
purpose for which it claims tax exemption and almost certainly runs
afoul of either the rule against private inurement or the rule against
private benefit.156 It may as well subject itself to personal liability for
breach of trust under state law.
All easements, but especially these easements, are supposed to
be straitjackets. So it is hardly surprising that subsequent owners,
and sometimes even the donors themselves, would seek to escape their
restraints. To curb one obvious sort of abuse, the regulations explicitly
bar the transfer of a conservation easement, for consideration or not,
except to another qualified holder that agrees to continue to enforce
it. 157 In addition, there are good reasons to believe that the courts will
think of conservation easements as a species of charitable trust. 15 8
Indeed, the regulations require that conservation easements only be
extinguishable in what amounts, for all practical purposes, to a
judicial cy pres proceeding:
If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property ... can
make impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes, the conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in

156. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201110020 (Mar. 11, 2011) (revoking exemption of
organization that accepted conservation easements, failed to monitor and enforce them, and
permitted amendment of at least one); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CAT. NO. 51527M, FORM 990

SCHEDULE D INSTRUCTIONS 2 (2013) (stating that tax-exempt status may be "undermined" if
easements have been amended in any way); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
EASEMENT AUDIT TECHNIQUES GUIDE 50-51 (2012) (requiring reduction

CONSERVATION
of amount of

contribution by any increase in the value of the landowner's other properties resulting from
conservation easement); Nancy A. McLaughlin & Benjamin Machlis, Amending and Terminating
Perpetual Conservation Easements, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 2009, at 52, 55 (noting that an
organization that allows amendment of an easement in a way that increases the value of the
servient estate, and thereby confers a benefit on its owner, would likely lose tax-exempt status).
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
158. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414 cmt. (amended 2004) ("Even though not accompanied by
the usual trappings of a trust, the creation and transfer of an easement for conservation or
preservation will frequently create a charitable trust."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) ("[C]ourts prefer to find that a purpose is limited to charity ... when
uncertain language is susceptible of a broader, not strictly charitable interpretation.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11 (2000) (stating that cy pres governs
modification and termination of conservation easements if their intended purpose becomes
impracticable); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-Deductible
Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment After Carpenter, Simmons, and
Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217, 235-36 (2012) (stating that courts are likely to interpret
conservation easements to achieve their charitable purposes); McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note
156, at 52-53 ("A number of sources indicate that tax-deductible conservation easements will be
treated as charitable trusts under state law."); Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, Hicks
v. Dowd, ConservationEasements and the CharitableTrust Doctrine: Setting the Record Straight,
10 Wyo. L. REV. 73, 76 (2010) (arguing that restricted gifts should be treated substantively as
charitable trusts). But see Carpenter v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001 (2012) (holding that a
conservation easement, although a restricted gift, was not a charitable trust).
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perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the
donee's proceeds ... from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the
donee organization in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the
original contribution. 159

To date, the state courts that have taken up the issue have generally
proceeded in essentially this way.160 It strikes this author, however,
that, no matter how tightly the regulations seek to link the underlying
federal tax inquiry to the traditional rules relating to cy pres, the two
scenarios are often likely to involve substantially different fact
patterns.
In the traditional cy pres case, something has usually gone
quite "wrong," making accomplishment of the initial charitable
purpose impossible, or practically so. A will creates a trust to promote
the elimination of slavery, for example, and promptly thereafter a
Civil War occurs, a President issues an Emancipation Proclamation,
and an amendment to the Constitution eliminates slavery once and for
all. 161 Or a will creates a public park "for the sole, perpetual and
unending, use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls,
white boys and white children of the City of Macon," and the Supreme
Court of the United States, interpreting another provision of the
Constitution, concludes that neither the city nor the private trustees
to whom it has handed off responsibility for operating the park can
continue to do so on a discriminatory basis. 162 These are cases in
which the particular charitable purpose involved has simply become
unworkable. Not all cy pres cases are precisely this abrupt, but most
are not much less so: a testator leaves an amount that pales in
comparison with that necessary to accomplish a particular purpose; 163
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i); see also Carpenter, 103 T.C.M. at 1001 (noting that if
the easement had been extinguishable only by cy pres, it would have met the perpetuity
requirement and been tax-deductible, despite being a restricted gift rather than a charitable
trust); Kaufman v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 294, 307 (2011) (referring to the regulation as a "regulatory
version of the doctrine of cy pres"), vacated in part on other grounds, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012);
1982 East, LLC v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. 1380 (2011) (citing the regulation).
160. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Att'y Gen. v. Miller, No. 20-C-98-003486, 1998
WL 35318061 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1998) (complaint seeking enforcement of conservation
easement against landowners seeking to subdivide); In re Pres. Alliance for Greater Phila., O.C.
No. 759 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Pa. June 28, 1999) (granting extinguishment of facade easement);
Tenn. Envtl. Council v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., No. 03-0775 (Ch. Ct. Hamilton Cnty., Tenn. Dec.
19, 2006); Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007), laterproceeding, Salzburg v. Dowd, Civ. No.
CV-2008-0079 (Wyo. Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2010). But see Walters & Otero Cnty. Land Trust, No.
05-CV-96 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 21, 2005) (order terminating easements in uncontested litigation);
Bjork v. Draper, 936 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (enforcing easement according to its terms
but not engaging in cy pres analysis).
161. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 546 (1867).
162. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
163. In re Estate of Thompson, 414 A.2d 881, 884 (Me. 1980).

2014]

FEDERALIZATION OF THE LAW OF CHARITY

1615

an indispensable third party refuses to participate; 164 or a named
charity ceases to exist. 165 These are all situations in which there is no
doubt that a major impediment to the continuation of the trust has
arisen. Nor is the impediment something the trustee and one or more
others have gotten together and instigated and/or negotiated. There is
simply an impasse caused by outside forces. 166
One cannot help but suspect that the typical fare of attempts to
wriggle free from the straitjacket of a conservation easement will be
very different. An estimated forty million acres are now subject to
perpetual conservation easements in this country. 167 This alone means
that the collisions between conservation easements and the perceived
need for flexibility to meet real or imagined changes will be myriad.
And the public pressure to respond to these supposed changes will
often be vastly more intense than that which surfaces in the typical cy
pres hearing. A mining or energy enterprise, for example, will discover
commercially attractive resources on or under the land and offer a
king's ransom to buy out the charity's easement; the local (or perhaps
even national) community will clamor for the project to proceed; and
the charity will salve its own conscience (as the regulations require) by
promising to devote the replacement treasures to similar conservation
purposes. Or a governmental unit will conclude that that it has a
"better" use for the land in question and threaten to resort to eminent
domain, and the charity, after negotiations, will conclude that a swap
for other land (or an easement on other land) will sufficiently serve
the conservation purposes. Or, over time, the lands surrounding the
subservient lands will change so dramatically that the charity
eventually decides simply to throw in the towel-for lucrative
consideration, of course. The almighty dollar, the governmental and
bureaucratic lust for additional facilities, and/or public pressure will
often prove "Irresistible."168
164. Weninger Estate v. Canadian Diabetes Ass'n (1993), 109 D.L.R. 4th 232 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
165. Simmons v. Parson Coll., 256 N.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Iowa 1977).
166. It is true that shades of gray occasionally emerge in litigation purporting to involve cy
pres. See, e.g., Homer B. Thompson, Opinion, In the Matter of the Estate of Beryl H. Buck,
reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 691, 749 (1987) ("Neither inefficiency nor ineffective philanthropy
constitute impracticability."). To date, however, such cases have been the exception and not the
rule.
167. Jessica E. Jay, Understanding When Perpetual Is Not Forever: An Update to the
Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual Conservation
Easements, and Response to Ann Taylor Schwing, 37 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 247 n.1 (2013).
168. Or the owner of the subservient land will simply find the restrictions irksome and ask
the charity to relieve him or her of them. In Bjork u. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct.),
appeal denied, 897 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 2008), for example, a new owner wished to build an addition
to a house and expand a driveway in violation of a conservation easement and agreed with the
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In none of these instances, however, is continuation of the
initial charitable purpose of the easement impossible-or anything
like it. Continuation is simply, or perhaps only arguably, inconvenient
to one or more third parties and/or certain elements of the public at
large who would prefer to put the land to what they regard as a
better-likely more profitable-use. And the fact that the regulations
require that any consideration received in exchange for the failed
conservation easement be applied by the charity to a similar
conservation purpose means that the courts will feel somewhat-or
perhaps even substantially-more willing to find a significant change
in circumstances than in the case of traditional cy pres, because in
traditional cy pres analysis, one possible outcome is that the property

returns to the private party who created the trust (or his or her
estate).169
Moreover, in the usual cy pres case, "all" that is at stake is
money-or fungible investment assets. If the parties and/or the court
choose to hew closely to the settlor's original intent, there are very few
with any real dog in the fight. One charity may feel slighted, perhaps
another charity will benefit, or perhaps the settlor's family was simply
hoping for a windfall. Regardless of the outcome, almost no one other
than the parties themselves ends up with any reason to feel harmed,
and one might well wonder how harmed even the parties themselves
are entitled to feel. But modifying or eliminating a conservation
easement, which by definition deals exclusively with the most unique
of all forms of property, real property, 170 has the potential to affect
large numbers of others.
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown171 is perhaps more predictive of
how the courts will react to this sort of litigation than the typical cy
pres proceeding. A testator created a trust and funded it with real
property located in the heart of downtown Waterbury, Connecticut. 172
His will barred the trustee from entering into leases longer than one
year and from erecting new buildings more than three stories high. 173
The hoped-for effect, obviously, was much like that of a modern-day
conservation easement. But when the trustee found the restrictions
irksome, the court was, one might suggest, all too willing to eliminate
charity to add additional land of equivalent size to the easement in return. In this instance, the
court refused to approve the swap. Id. at 574.
169.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

TRUSTS § 399 & cmt. c (1959).
170. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2012).
171. 135 A. 555 (Conn. 1926).
172. Id. at 558.
173. Id.

§ 67

& cmt. b (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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them. Ordinarily, settlors are free to impose virtually any restriction
they wish on their trustees' conduct.17 4 Here, however, the court
referred expressly to "public policy" and alluded vaguely to the
adverse effects that such restrictions might have on neighboring
properties and even the community at large.17 5 Note, as well, that this
was a purely private trust, the duration of which was strictly limited
by the Rule Against Perpetuities 176-not a charitable trust explicitly
designed, and required, to last "in perpetuity." If the court in this case
was unabashedly impatient with a purely temporary restriction on a
few buildings in a small town, think how impatient another court
might someday become with a "perpetual" restriction on tens or
hundreds of thousands of acres of "empty" land sitting on vast energy
reserves, or even a few acres of wetlands impeding the development of
a new residential, commercial, industrial, military, or other
governmental project for which popular support was strong.
It is true that the regulations require a "judicial proceeding" to
extinguish a conservation easement.177 So the charity is not
completely free to wheel and deal; it cannot, for example, simply swap
one easement for another or for money. 178 The key word in the
regulation may therefore be "impracticable." It is an exceedingly
capacious word. Litigants will continuously mouth it, and resultoriented judges may seek to hide behind its billowing skirts. It is also,
however, a word that has long appeared in black-letter restatements
of the law of trusts,17 9 and, to date, its capaciousness has not come to
dominate cy pres doctrine or rotted away the lodestar of trust law, i.e.,
fidelity to donor intent. Still, one cannot help but wonder whether the
inevitable litigation over the stickiness of conservation easements,
which in both what they control and their potential for spill-over

174. Id. at 564 (quoting Holmes v. Conn. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 A. 640, 642 (Conn.
1918)).
175. Id. at 567 (Wheeler, C., concurring).
176. Id. at 560.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (as amended in 2009).
178. See Belk v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878 (2013) (denying deductions for easements
that permitted trustee to swap land covered by the easement); Carpenter v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1001 (2012) (denying deductions for easements that permitted donee to consent to
extinguish them), reconsiderationdenied, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (2013); I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv.
Mem. 2012-0017 (Mar. 5, 2012). But see Comm'r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(allowing deductions for easements that permitted donee to consent to changes or to abandon
easement).
179. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 399 (1959).

§ 67

(2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
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effects are demonstrably very different from the usual charitable
trust, will be similarly respectful of current cy pres doctrine. 180
VI. MISCELLANEOUS FEDERAL INTRUSIONS INTO THE LAW OF CHARITY
In the not-so-distant past, many states had legislation limiting
the size or timing of bequests to charity. 181 These limitations have
since almost entirely disappeared, in part due to concerns about their
constitutionality. 182
Many states have sought to regulate charitable fundraising.
But a series of federal cases have effectively gutted those efforts.1 83
Nor, in this instance, has the federal government stepped in to fill the
void. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has jurisdiction
over only those interstate charitable solicitations that are engaged in
by for-profit solicitors.184 There is other, miscellaneous federal
oversight of various aspects of charitable fundraising, 185 but it seems
fair to say that much of the field is now essentially unregulated.
Many states now have statutes that give trustees and/or
executors extensive powers to deal with potential liabilities under the
federal environmental laws. 186 These statutes are not, of course, aimed
directly at charities, charitable bequests, or charitable trusts, but they
can affect them dramatically.

180. For a thoroughly optimistic view thoughtfully dismissing such concerns, see Nancy A.
McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to The End
of Perpetuity, 9 Wyo. L. REV. 1, 69-74 (2009). In fact, there seems to be an ongoing full-throated
debate involving exactly the sorts of questions I have posed here, i.e., just how "perpetual" can
conservation easements actually be? Compare, e.g., Jay, supra note 167 (arguing for clearer
guidance as to how to amend conservation easements), with, e.g., Schwing, supra note 151
(arguing that it is wrong to promote amendment and termination of conservation easements).
181.

See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS

§ 35

(2d ed. 1953) (stating

that twelve jurisdictions had timing or size limitations on charitable bequests).
182. See MARK L. ASCHER, ELIAS CLARK, GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH & ARTHUR W. MURPHY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 224-26 (6th ed. 2013).

183. E.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003); Riley
v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980).
184. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2005); PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 620 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2011).
185.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.

2011).
186. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE
(West 2013).

§ 816(13)

§ 620

cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,

(amended 2004); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.

§

113.025

2014]

FEDERALIZATION OF THE LAW OF CHARITY

1619

VII. CONCLUSION

It is absurd to argue that a government that hands out tax
exemptions and eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions to
entities that describe themselves as charities does not have the right
or, indeed, a sacred responsibility to police the entitlements of the
recipients of that largess. Thus, at least so long as we assume that
charities should be tax-exempt and eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions, the federal government seems plainly entitled, if not
obligated, both to identify the charities that initially qualify as such
and to make certain that those that have already qualified behave in a
manner consistent with the rationale for granting them these
substantial benefits. Moreover, there is virtual consensus that the
states have never been good at, or even truly interested in, policing
charities and those who run them. Once the federal government got
into the business of taxing income, gifts, and estates, and
substantially subsidizing charity in the process, it basically had no
option other than to assume primary responsibility for enforcing
charity nationally.
That said, it is nigh impossible to argue that federalization of
the law of charity has been an entirely good thing. First, the mindnumbingly complex patchwork of federal excise taxes leaves one
wondering how things ever got so screwed up. If ever there were a
topic that cried out for rationalization and serious simplification, this
is surely it. Second, there is reason to believe that federalization of the
law of charity does not always simply supplement state law, but that
federal law sometimes strains, changes, and even crowds out state
law. Third, federalization of the law of charity has undeniably
increased the complexity and expense of organizing and operating
charities and planning for the disposition of private wealth to or for
the benefit of charitable undertakings.
Again, however, the point of this paper is much simpler: these
days, just about the only charity-related law that really matters is
federal.

